Reference ID10KIGALI24 (original text)SubjectNSS OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST NTAGANDA ARREST, CALLSOriginEmbassy KigaliClassificationCONFIDENTIALReleasedAug 30, 2011 01:44CreatedJan 11, 2010 16:55
VZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHLGB #0024/01 0111655 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 111655Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6572 INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000024 SIPDIS E.O.
12958: DECL: 01/11/2019 TAGS: CG,
RW SUBJECT: NSS OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST NTAGANDA ARREST, CALLS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF MARCH 23 AGREEMENT IN DRC
Classified By: Ambassador W. Stuart Symington for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d )
1. (C) SUMMARY: Joseph Nzabamwita, head of the National Security Service (NSS)'s Department of External Intelligence and Security, on December 14, pressed visiting EU Great Lakes Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer and Deputy to the U.S. Special Advisor for the Great Lakes James Yellin for Western support to combat FDLR leadership, warned that an arrest of CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda would be destabilizing, and called for implementation of the March 23 agreement between the GDRC and the CNDP. DCM and UK ambassador also attended the meeting, which took place in Nzabamwita's office. END SUMMARY.
EU SPECIAL ENVOY ON CONGO'S TROUBLED EAST
2. (C) Nzabamwita welcomed his visitors with a flourish and invited all to speak freely and openly. Van de Geer, drawing on his recent visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with Yellin, said it was difficult for the Government of the DRC (GDRC) to act with "determination and timeliness" and said the accelerated DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) integration "has cracks." The army had not been paid, fed or equipped, and there were many defections; but the good news was the soldiers' names had been successfully reinstated in the computers so that correct payments could be made.
3. (C) Regarding the Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), van de Geer said Bosco Ntaganda remained in the FARDC, but was nervous and engaged in a two-pronged policy: he had his own group in the army and he was reinforcing his supporters in Masisi, which was becoming "CNDP Boscoland." (Note: After CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda was arrested by Rwandan authorities in early 2009, the bulk of its members agreed to integrate into the FARDC. End Note.) MONUC felt there had been some military progress with respect to the FDLR, but it was, in fact, very limited, van de Geer said. (Note: The FDLR is an armed Rwandan group based in eastern DRC that opposes the Government of Rwanda and includes former members and supporters of the Rwandan government that orchestrated the 1994 genocide. End Note.) The FDLR controls the bush; the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) controls the roads and towns so it had become a classic guerilla situation. There were direct confrontations between CNDP-inclusive FARDC units and the FDLR. There had been many atrocities and the GDRC needed to take more responsibility, Van de Geer asserted. MONUC was under pressure from many sides, including, indirectly, Kigali; however, MONUC's withdrawal would mean victory for the FDLR.
4. (C) Van de Geer summarized his discussion with Jean Sayinzoga, Chairman of Rwanda's Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (see reftel), and called on Rwanda to exercise maximum pressure for voluntary returns of FDLR rank-and-file. The EU and United States are pushing for returns and want to stick to the text of the 2007 Nairobi Communique, i.e., return to Rwanda, but were willing to support any flexible solution agreed upon by Rwanda and the DRC. Van de Geer saluted Rwandan outreach, renewed Rwandan-French relations and the exchange of Ambassadors between the DRC and Rwanda but expressed concern that the GDRC was "outside the game" in eastern DRC, Kabila's failure to visit the United States or UK, and the overall difficulty to dialogue with him. With respect to CNDP leader Bosco Qto dialogue with him. With respect to CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda, Van de Geer contrasted the comment by Nzabamwita during a previous visit that "Rwanda has a moderating influence on the CNDP largely through Bosco so we don't support his arrest now" with that of Congolese generals who said Ntaganda could be arrested. UK ambassador then asked whether Ntaganda might leave the FARDC and form his own group.
RWANDAN OFFICIAL URGES CONTINUED PRESSURE ON FDLR…
5. (C) Nzabamwita spoke of the need to "stay the course," arguing that there were no quick fixes for the FDLR nor in the wake of the insecurity that came out of genocide. He described Umoju Wetu, the combined Rwandan-Congolese military offensive against the FDLR that took place in early 2009, as the culmination of all that had gone before it and the FDLR as "at the heart" of security concerns for Rwanda. He called for support within the region and from Europe, the United States, and the UN since FDLR actions in eastern DRC were being coordinated from Western capitals. Nzabamwita asked rhetorically: "How is it possible to coordinate divergent interests in different capitals? If it took Germany ten years to arrest FDLR leader Murwanashyaka, how long would it take the DRC to act?"
6. (C) Nzabamwita said that when FARDC and MONUC continued operations (after Umoja Wetu, as Kimia II), the FDLR changed its strategy and tactics to create chaos in eastern DRC; Rwanda told Special Representative of the Secretary General Alan Doss of the change in strategy and insisted MONUC and the FARDC were not defeating the FDLR. When asked if there were any forces capable of dealing with the FDLR, Nzabamwita said the Rwandan Defense Forces might be able to get quicker, better results, but would benefit from command and control capabilities from the U.S. and Europe.
7. (C) Nzabamwita then compared the Rwandan situation with FDLR to that of the U.S. against Al Qaida. He suggested the FDLR be listed as a terrorist organization in the U.S., said that UNSCR 1804 and other resolutions needed to be implemented, and people "who undermine the security of the Great Lakes" should be sanctioned. (Note: The FDLR has not targeted Americans and is not listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the USG. A predecessor organization, ALIR (Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, aka Interahamwe or ex-FAR), is listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List, which designated terrorist organizations for immigration purposes. In tandem with UNSCR 1533, the USG has designated several FDLR members under E.O. 13413 as subject to an asset freeze, travel ban and prohibiting Amcits from engaging in transactions with them. End Note.) ...AND SAYS UMOJA WETU FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED RWANDA-DRC RELATIONS
8. (C) Regarding the CNDP, Nzabamwita said Umoja Wetu fundamentally changed the bilateral relationship between Rwanda and the DRC and helped neutralize the "internal civil war" among the CNDP, PARECO and various Mai Mai groups. Rwanda was able to help join FARDC and CNDP structures together. Although the integration was quick, the CNDP stopped fighting the FARDC. It was a misinterpretation that Rwanda controlled the CNDP, Nzabamwita continued. There were FARDC units with some former CNDP members who collaborated with the FDLR against the GDRC on the ground. Nzabamwita called Rwanda's Western Province his country's "breadbasket" - the source of gas, tourism revenues, and its most fertile land. The GDRC-CNDP agreement of March 23, 2009 still has not been implemented and if there were an alliance between former CNDP and FDLR elements, it would be a threat. Rwanda is more interested in the stability of this region than Kinshasa, Nzabamwita claimed. (Note: The March 23 agreement specifies, among other things, that the CNDP will transform itself into a political party and will integrate its fighters into the Congolese army and police. End Note.).
WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO ARREST NTAGANDA
9. (C) UK ambassador again raised the possibility of further political fragmentation if authorities arrested Bosco Ntaganda. Nzabamwita said that it would take time for the CNDP and Kinshasa to develop trust in one another. The CNDP agreed to join with FARDC because Rwanda would be there to guarantee implementation of its political demands, but the CNDP was not one hundred percent happy: there were two factions and a lack of implementation. The group now taking the upper hand is asking, "Why did Bosco sell us out?" Then there is the international community and the International Criminal Court, which are demanding that Ntaganda's arrest. QCriminal Court, which are demanding that Ntaganda's arrest. "But this so-called criminal brokered the peace." This area needs to be stable in order to implement justice.
10. (C) Nzabamwita then returned to the theme of "no quick fixes." He described Ntaganda as a "victim" who was "being paid a private first class salary" and said that arresting him would not help the situation. Rather, the solution was to "go to Kinshasa and tell the leadership that the lack of implementation of the March 23 Agreement will increase fragmentation." He added that if Bosco were arrested, "you would surely have ten Boscos. You touch him and you touch the rank and file of the CNDP. Is he the worst criminal in eastern DRC?" UK ambassador asked if Ntaganda would stay where he was or move elsewhere with his militia forces if left alone. Nzabamwita said that he "still has to think about the ICC, so where would he go?" Ntaganda tried to contain several ex-CNDP battalions that wanted to mutiny, he added. Let all the parties stick to implementation and we should oversee implementation. What message do you send if you arrest Bosco? If this agenda is driven by international NGOs, it will be a disaster. "You will crumble Kinshasa."
11. (C) COMMENT: Nzabamwita's professional role is to monitor and combat the GOR's external enemies, chief of which is the FDLR. He reiterated the GOR's views on issues such as the GOR's relationship with the CNDP and the DRC, the need for international pressure on the FDLR, and the possible effect of arresting current CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda. Nzabamwita made clear that continued Rwandan-DRC and international cooperation was essential to defeat the FDLR. END COMMENT. SYMINGTON
COMMENTS (10KIGALI24)